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Abstract
The structuring relationship between the material world and the world of culture is variously
embodied in the figure of the corpse. To ask how corpses mean as matter is to attend to them as
“things themselves”—by bracketing the freighted assumptions and naturally mixed feelings we have
when we encounter something that cannot but remind us of our own mortality. Corpses force us to
think of putrefaction—and allow us, via a complex system of cultural and representational practices,
to just as quickly disavow this unpleasantness. Wherever the corpse appears, then, it brings with it
ideas about the relationship between representation and the real, or, more precisely, about the matter
of subjectivity.
This materiality also crucially constitutes the corpse’s difference from the identity of the deceased,
and it is here where the corpse may thus do more than simply reference the past. The end point of the
argument, then, is to work towards a vocabulary that allows this difference—this material
remainder—to figure meaningfully in practices of grief and mourning that may not point exclusively
back towards the deceased (and inevitably a particular version of that person’s legacy) but towards
the future and towards polysemic, even conflicting ideas of the responsibility placed upon us by this
death.
This paper opens a discussion of corpses as “vibrant matter” (to borrow Jane Bennett’s provocative
term) whose materiality is an equal partner to their cultural significance. My reading opens a
conversation about the very real work of corpses as things capable of organizing diverse affect that in
turn may become considered action.
Following Bennett’s reading of Deleuze and Latour, I account for the corpse as both deceased subject
and material object by framing it as a kind of assemblage. As remains, the corpse is essentially
referential, the remains of someone. But remains are also material, matter that functions as an actant
in concert with the processes of decomposition, with the interventions of photography and
embalming, with the cultural practices of disposal that ritually encounter and resolve this
“remaining.”
The corpse diversely and dynamically organizes the cultural, the representational, the biological, the
subjective and the objective, the ritual and the metaphysical. I argue that lingering with the corpse as
a dynamic assemblage allows for the development of a nuanced and materialistic notion of agency. I
further suggest that this kind of reading provocatively develops Bill Brown’s question, “What might
scholars accomplish through a materialist analysis of media?” Corpses are unique objects in that they
already suggest themselves as figures of the material, thus literally embodying the question of what a
materialist media studies might look like. Corpses communicate something to us about the flesh; they
are the not-so-passive objects of technological, ritual and representational practices; they are the
perfect starting point for a materialist communication and media studies.
Keywords
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 Introduction 
Dead bodies are material things that bear a referential relationship to an absent subject. 
They are in this sense a kind of medium, connecting the living to the memory of a 
deceased. As such, they are the perfect starting point to what Bill Brown has termed a 
“materialist analysis of media.”1  The corpse is a material thing freighted with the most 
intense cultural meaning. To look at death practices from the starting point of the corpse 
is thus to inquire precisely into the relationship between the material and the textual, 
between the thing itself and the rich variety of representational texts required to make 
sense of it, to venture between the world of specific cultural and historical practice, and 
the universality of death. A materialist analysis of media begins with the corpse because 
the corpse is itself a complex figure of mediation.  
For the corpse is precisely not a material object among others. It is a special kind 
of thing whose physical existence is a matter of no small cultural significance—and 
whose discursive power is inseparable from its materiality. This complex intertwining of 
the discursive and the biological is why the corpse is such a rich site for exploring what 
we mean by materialism. I am interested in sketching the outlines of a materialism that is 
neither inert, ineffable noumenon—the unreachable “thing in itself”—nor reducible to 
signification. This outline starts with the dead body, but it also implicates the study of 
media as both conduit and substrate in its refiguring. 
The corpse combines the organic material of the body with the symbolic power of 
death. The corpse is, on the one hand, a material thing, subject to the laws of biology and 
physics. It has weight and heft; it will decompose at a certain rate under certain physical 
conditions; it responds to moisture and heat, and so on. On the other hand, these material 
properties provoke horror, as we all fear death and flinch at the thought of our own 
corpses. Nevertheless, because this powerful symbolism rests precisely upon the corpse 
as dead flesh, its meaning is not reducible to mere cultural effect. It is the corpse as thing 
that commands such powerful symbolic efficacy. It frightens because it is vulnerable and 
passive—because it scares us to imagine our own bodies as subject to the biological 
imperatives of decomposition. Corpses depend on the living to treat them with respect 
and dignity, to guide them carefully into some kind of not being there. The corpse is thus 
both a powerfully suggestive cultural text and an incontrovertibly material object. 
Ritual practices surrounding the corpse constitute this figuring of a relationship 
between the material world and signification. They forge a kind of mediation, or tell a 
kind of story about what is being remembered here, in this way, through this flesh, this 
monument, this absence. How we prepare the corpse, how we lay it to rest, and how we 
mark the space of this passing are all highly symbolic practices that construct a 
contingent understanding of death, memory, and the meaning of life.  These practices 
articulate cultural values: they designate inheritance, they affirm identity and continuity, 
and they provide a space for the memory of the deceased. They do so, however, with a 
material object as the centerpiece: the practices themselves account for and contextualize 
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the movement of this thing from here, from the present, to the there of memory, afterlife, 
legacy. 
Furthermore, images of the corpse have been used in popular and devotional art 
for centuries to invoke the fleeting vanity of the living body.2 Corpses may symbolize the 
power of the state, as in public executions, or the wrongful and horrible abuse of that 
power, as with photographs of atrocity. The corpse functions as an archetypical symbol 
of human finality, of the power of death as something that always threatens subjectivity 
from elsewhere, always destabilizes the present with the threat of flux, decay, 
disappearance and oblivion.  
Wherever the corpse appears, then, it both figures (represents) and literally is a 
figure of a relation: between life and death, this life and the next, the present and the time 
of memory. The corpse is a literal figure for mediation, an object in transition between 
one kind of being and another. This is why it is such a compelling starting point for a 
materialist analysis of media. Attending to the corpse as a thing opens up a theorization 
of the material substrate of communication—it holds “media” accountable to its all-to-
often latent connotation of physical medium. But by choosing the corpse as a starting 
point and not, for example, the radio wave or the fiberoptic cable, it is also possible to 
take seriously the symbolic power that this object wields. In other words, there is no 
biological determinism possible with the corpse, for its physicality is also the reason for 
its cultural power. To begin with the corpse, itself a hybrid object is to thus find a third 
way out of the long established tendency towards determinism in the field, be it 
technological, economic, or cultural determinism.  
And, technologies of inscription and archive are central to the modern encounter 
with the dead.  Freidrich Kittler reminds us that the “realm of the dead is as extensive as 
the storage and transmission capabilities of a given culture,” 3 a remark that foregrounds 
the reasons why media studies might want to account for the corpse. If we want to 
understand better the role media play in our lives, we could do worse than to look at how 
they help us make sense of death. 
 
What Is A Corpse? 
Though we may intuitively know the corpse, at least enough to be afraid of it, the stakes 
of understanding it within a materialist media studies touch upon the question of ethics, 
of social action, and identity. So what is a corpse? A corpse may be said to be an 
assemblage of multiple elements, some of which are human and some of which are not. 
The flesh itself is taxonomically human, but because it is no longer living, it is not 
functionally human. It is also a particular molecular and chemical combination, and these 
are in constant flux both in the living organism and after it has died. Then there are the 
bacteria that undertake the process of decomposition, and the conditions (temperature, 
moisture, acidity) under which they work.  
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There may also be introduced—by human agency—chemical detergents, resins, 
and waxes that slow this process of decomposition. A corpse may also be photographed, 
which is one human and technological way of halting this decomposition. I will look at 
both of these interventions as part of the emergent effects of corpses as assemblages, but I 
want to spend some time thinking about the corpse in itself, before these interventions. 
The corpse is a special kind of thing, in that it has a special relationship to subjectivity. 
That relationship is one of reference, or pointing, a gesture towards. To refer comes from 
the Latin to bear or carry—to carry again, to bear again something to something else. To 
refer entails a kind of pointing or gesture. As “remains,” the corpse is a referential 
thing—it is the remains of someone. Even when that someone is not identified, a corpse 
always references a human departure, a subject who has left it behind. An anonymous 
corpse nevertheless refers, if only to a general sense of shared humanity, to the notion of 
a sovereign self with rights over the fate of its own flesh, if nothing else. The corpse is 
also a liminal thing. The relationship to subjectivity that makes it special is a fleeting one: 
as soon as decomposition begins, the corpse looks less and less like the deceased, and 
becomes more and more a site of horror and abjection. Its ontology is unstable, its 
resemblance fleeting, its power to refer bounded by time, and by the material constraints 
of the biological flesh itself. 
 As organic material, the corpse precisely differs from either living, embodied 
subjectivity or from the various texts that comprise the memory of that subjectivity. The 
corpse’s materiality is thus also the site of its difference from the deceased, and from the 
memory of the deceased, and hence the site of its polysemy. In the flesh—precisely 
where embalming and photography make their different interventions—the corpse differs 
as well as resembles, and thus points towards the heterogeneity of legacy. As organic 
matter, the corpse is taken up into a variety of assemblages that produce the effect of 
memory, legacy, inheritance. Nevertheless, because the assemblage is never merely the 
sum of its parts, the same corpse may give rise to a number of effects, both stabilizing 
and destabilizing. Embalming and photography, as technologies that work on the corpse 
as organic matter, are also parts of assemblages that produce inheritance and memory. 
But because these effects are emergent, they are continually produced and reproduced in 
different contexts. An assemblage of flesh and embalming that may produce the effect of 
identity in one moment may produce a destabilizing effect that turns identity into 
heterogeneity, or solemnity into farce. This possibility of a destabilizing effect is clear, 
for example, every time the Russian government debates whether to finally bury Lenin’s 
corpse or leave it on display. The longer it is displayed, the harder it is to maintain its 
identity with a revolution that has now ended. Its preservation—the very process that 
allowed it to signify permanent revolution—now threatens to turn his legacy into a 
morbid curiosity, his grave into a circus.4 Whether as solemn memorial or morbid 
curiosity, the corpse as material substrate is the condition of possibility for any kind of 
effect. 
 Attending to corpses as things, as non-human material elements in assemblages 
whose effects are heterogeneous and potentially destabilizing of proper identity helps 
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build the vocabulary needed to theorize a properly ethical materialist media studies. 
Asking how corpses mean as matter attends to them as things and allows us to understand 
how they embody mediation as both a concept and as a lived reality. 
 
Assemblage Theory 
In this essay, I theorize the corpse as “vibrant matter,” as a dynamic assemblage of both 
human and non-human elements. These elements include not only the complex 
confederation of affect, social and ritual practice, and biological substrate that make up 
the corpse as such, but also the technological means by which corpses are preserved and 
produced as socially meaningful: photography and embalming. If the event of death is an 
encounter with the corpse as a heterogeneous assemblage of material and affective 
elements, it is also mediated by technological interventions on the body that both 
facilitate its meaningfulness (by slowing decomposition and allowing for viewing, for 
example) and produce that meaningfulness (by collaborating to create a certain “look” for 
the corpse as a meaningful symbol). Assemblage theory furnishes a vocabulary to talk 
about the corpse in the fullness of its heterogeneity as a material object, as the medium 
for the production of cultural meaning, and as a powerfully emotional signifier. 
The term “vibrant matter” comes from Jane Bennett, who identifies the “locus of 
political responsibility” in “a human-nonhuman assemblage.”5 Bennett is concerned to 
theorize agency as something other than purely human, particularly in the case of 
environmental crises that increasingly demand an understanding of how non-human 
forces such as electricity or waste impact the human. Human desire and intention reaches 
a stark impasse when it faces death, which always appears to us as something opposed to 
our own control or agency. We may wish for death, or wish it on another. But we are 
only at worst the bearers of death, whose arrival is always from without, otherwise than 
human, elsewhere, somewhere off stage. Death arrives, death takes us, death visits us—
but even when we invite it, it is always a stranger who comes and goes at will. In 
theorizing the corpse, then, it seems that non-human agency—in this case, death itself—
must be a key part of the picture. 
 Deleuze and Guattari use the word “assemblage” to distinguish it from 
functionalist theories of the organism. Rather than an organic whole of dependent parts 
functioning in unison, an assemblage is an uneven and shifting collection of disparate 
parts, none of which has essential dominion over any other.6  
In assemblages you find states of things, bodies, various combinations of bodies, 
hodgepodges; but you also find utterances, modes of expression, and whole regimes of 
signs…. But an assemblage is first and foremost what keeps very heterogeneous elements 
together: e.g. a sound, a gesture, a position, etc., both natural and artificial elements. The 
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problem is one of “consistency” or “coherence,” and it prior to the problem of behavior. 
How do things take on consistency? How do they cohere?7 
This coherence is provisional and strategic, organized around two different axes, the 
material and the expressive.8 These axes refer to the potential roles that the components 
may play in the creation of this emergent identity or consistency.9 As Bennett clarifies, 
the effects of any assemblage are “emergent in that their ability to make something 
happen…is distinct from the sum of the vital force of each materiality considered 
alone”.10 Material elements and non-material elements are therefore non hierarchically 
arranged and rearranged to create diverse effects. 
 These effects may be either stabilizing or destabilizing, or to use Deleuze and 
Guattari’s language, territorializing or deterritorializing.11 In other words, the material 
and expressive elements of an assemblage may create the effect of a stable identity effect, 
or they may create an effect that is incoherent and chaotic, non identical and changeable. 
 When finding ways to articulate how the body itself functions within this process, 
it is vital to account for the multiple valences along which memory may reach forward 
into legacy and inheritance. Because the body itself is the literal site of difference from 
either the textuality of legacy and remembrance or the life of the deceased, this 
heterogeneity is an inherent feature, inseparable from its enfleshment. Understanding the 
corpse as an assemblage thus provides a vocabulary to theorize the multiple and 
contested legacies, for deceased whose identities are at any moment provisional and 
changeable. For example, the identity to which the embalmed body of Vladmir Lenin 
refers may appear to be stable, enshrined as it is within the political rhetoric of the tomb 
and the social practices of reverence that it organizes. Nevertheless, this identity is not 
stable, as the changing political and social conditions in Moscow amply demonstrate. 
Moreover, the move to assert a stable identity for the deceased—a fixed legacy—reveals 
much about the political and ideological investments in any particular context. To 
theorize the corpse as an assemblage whose effects may either stabilize or destabilize that 
identity, then, allows into the conversation those memories and legacies that are precisely 
not hegemonic, whose memories are marginalized and silenced. The condition of 
possibility for this polysemy is the corpse’s special materiality. 
These are the stakes of thinking the corpse as the material beginnings of memory, 
inheritance, and ultimately ethics. Derrida explores the notion of legacy in Specters of 
Marx, showing how the relationship with the dead is one of responsibility to “those who 
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are not there, those who are no longer or who are not yet present and living.”12 In this 
sense, the living present is always ethically called by a beyond, by a “not there.” This 
calling happens via the concept of memory as a kind inheritance, more properly called 
legacy. Crucially, any legacy is heterogeneous, meaning that to accept (or reject) any 
legacy is to make a critical choice, to impose finitude.13 What the dead “would have 
wanted” is always an uneven terrain, and uncertain—it is always in some sense a secret 
that mocks us, asking us whether we understand, whether we can decipher it. Think of the 
US constitution, something we think of as an inheritance from our “founding fathers.” 
This document has been endlessly deciphered and interpreted, and each time—as for 
example in an Amendment—there is a critical choice made, an interpretation that puts the 
(provisional) stamp of finitude upon the endless and conflicting interpretations. The same 
is true of the kinds of legacy narratives woven (and continually revised) about the dead 
whose contributions we must always interpret even as we remember and celebrate (or 
vilify) them.  
 This critical choice can be understood as an act of memory or mourning. When 
we interpret an inheritance, we remember the person it came from, and act in their name. 
The amendment to the constitution identifies the founders’ intentions: in a sense, it 
remembers them as the fathers whose encrypted intentions we inherited. If I decide to 
keep the family land I inherited, to farm it rather than selling it, I am making a critical 
decision about the reasons why it was given me. In doing so, I also invoke the memory of 
those who bequeathed it, perhaps even justifying my actions by saying it was what they 
“would have wanted.” In every instance it is our responsibility to ensure that those who 
have the right to identify their dead are not only those who wield cultural and economic 
power. 
In a more subtle sense, to make this kind of critical choice also identifies and 
localizes the dead. Again, this identification is a right all too often claimed by those who 
wield social power. To say, “this is what my father would have wanted,” is to also name 
this father, to identify him as the dead person whose inheritance I am now interpreting. 
To receive an inheritance, in other words, is to receive it from someone; whenever one 
deciphers that inheritance by making a critical choice then, one remembers the dead by 
identifying them, by reaffirming their unique identities, their desires, their connection to 
me and to my present. It is also to localize them, in the sense that to invoke the name is 
also to place it as elsewhere, in the realm of the nonliving. 
Whenever I identify and localize the dead by invoking their memory in the 
interpretation of an inheritance, I also do it in the name of the generations to come.  An 
inheritance is never mine alone, but something I may pass it along to those who come 
after me. You can even think of this in terms of genetic traits: I inherited my father’s blue 
eyes, and I may pass those on to my children, or I may not. But whenever I make that 
critical decision (to say, “this blue is my father’s blue”), in this moment of identification 
and localization I unite the dead with the unborn. That which is received from beyond—
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from the not there of death—is also something that marks the present with a disjuncture 
that implies the not there of those yet to come. 
The corpse is a critical player in this notion of inheritance as memory and 
responsibility. The corpse localizes and identifies the dead: it is always the body of 
someone, and it is always localized in a particular resting place. Even when these two 
conditions are not met, they still obtain: the unmarked graves of Argentina’s period of 
state terror, for example, serve as a localizer and identifier of the injustice done there. 
That the bodies of the “disappeared” are missing is itself the index of the terror, and 
human rights activism works in part by putting names and faces to those whom the state 
would seek to obliterate. It is this kind of marginalized voice, which struggles to name 
the dead and to demand the right to inherit in their name, that an assemblage theory of the 
corpse acknowledges in its heterogeneity. How we understand the corpse, then, and how 
we identify and localize it, becomes an absolutely central process to the responsibility to 
which the dead call us. This responsibility in turn becomes the basis for actions, for the 
critical interpretations of inheritance that make up our political and social life. 
Using the language of assemblage theory, the corpse moves from the material to 
the expressive axis by means of reference. In the case of embalming and photography, 
reference is in a visual register: the corpse looks like. But even before these mediations, 
which operate at the level of appearances, the corpse refers visually. When someone is 
called upon to identify a body, often this happens through simple visual recognition. 
Though anyone who has seen the dead body of a loved one will tell you that the corpse is 
never identical to the living, that it lacks that ineffable spark, the corpse is uncannily like 
the deceased. It is unheimlich—at home and away from home, strange and familiar. We 
may say, then, that the corpse’s reference bears some relationship to the visual. Unlike 
the anonymous grinning skull of the skeleton, the corpse bears likeness.  
More precisely, the modern corpse bears likeness by means of two major 
technological interventions whose bias is towards likeness or resemblance: photography 
and embalming. These technologies become in turn actants in the corpse assemblage, 
signifying in particular ways when articulated to the dead body and its deceased referent. 
    
Photography and Embalming 
“The photograph embalms time, rescuing it simply from its proper corruption”14 
The line quoted above has occasioned an entire body of scholarship on the 
relationship between the photographic image, indexicality, and death.15 Photography is 
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not only like embalming, however—embalming is like photography. Both technologies 
developed in the context of a “larger, emergent culture of preservation” in the nineteenth 
century.16  These media not only preserved the liminal, representational quality of corpses, 
but also shaped the look of the modern corpse.17  These practices thus came to delineate 
and police how bodies became meaningfully “legible” representations of death and its 
relationship to representation.   
Photography and embalming are both media that seek to capture and forestall the 
corpse’s inherent liminality.  Photography does this by capturing the image of the corpse 
before it rots; embalming does it by intervening chemically in the process of putrefaction 
itself.  Despite their different techniques, both mediations preserve the appearance of the 
flesh as such.  The embalmed corpse, like the subject of postmortem photography before 
it, looks “as if it were sleeping,” suspended between this life and the next.  
Mediation of death via photography and embalming is also congruent with the 
effacement of death from modern life, making the corpse’s legibility—the conditions 
under which it may or may not meaningfully appear as legacy, memory, as reference to a 
deceased—not only an historical question, but also an ideological one.   
As a result, with industrialization and urbanization—central movements in both 
the history of media and of the subject—the corpse is uniquely positioned in mass society 
as both “deceased subject” and commodity (object). Indeed, as embalmers became 
experts who had to be licensed and regulated, they began to be active and paid 
participants in private experiences of mourning.  One has only to think of the quiet space 
of the funeral home viewing room and the laboratories hidden beneath to grasp the 
complex boundaries modern embalming maintains between public and private, science 
and nature.   
I also see a crucial parallel between the wet mount emulsions that would 
democratize photography and the chemical solution that made the corpse a “postmortem 
subject”.  Embalming is of interest not only as a technology-- the pump—but also 
because the fluid is a chemical used to preserve the flesh in the appearance of life.  For 
both media, this chemical inscription becomes the basis for the corpse’s univocal 
reference to the deceased.  
As photographs of the dead entered into the collection of artifacts and relics used 
in the cultural representation of grief and death, so too did ideas about how a dead body 
should look and be looked at. Generally, the corpse as we know it today may be said to 
have emerged out of what Crary has called the “disciplining of vision” in the nineteenth 
century. 18 More specifically, the relationship between postmortem photography and 
embalming outlined here supports Gunning’s assertion that nineteenth century 
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 Jonathan Sterne, The Audible Past: Cultural Origins of Sound Reproduction (Durham: Duke 
University Press Books, 2003), 292. Sterne is documenting the history of sound recording, 
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photography produced “the standardization of imagery” for industrial societies.19 As 
photography established how to make visible the conditions of life under industrialization 
and modernity, it also provided a template to envision death under the same.   
Photography predates embalming technology by about thirty years, and it wasn’t 
until about 1890 that embalming became widespread enough to replace ice as the 
dominant form of preservation.20 Embalming inherited a certain ‘look’ for the corpse that 
portraiture and death photography had established, making its preservative goals not 
merely literal (stopping decomposition) but also symbolic, in the sense that the corpse 
signifies peaceful sleep. The practice of postmortem photography informed the aesthetics 
of embalming, the ways it represents death in the medium of the flesh. 
This aesthetic represents death as peace, and as ultimately conserving the social 
identity of the deceased. People die in all kinds of confusion, agony, and bodily distortion.  
Funeral convention demands that we erase these signs of suffering from the countenance 
of the deceased.  Just as embalming protects us, as Quigley writes, from the “sights, 
sounds and smells”21 of our loved one’s impending putrefaction, so does the arrangement 
of the body protect us from imagining their suffering.  It places the body in a kind of 
future perfect, when the deceased will have been received happily into the fold of 
whatever afterlife awaits, at peace with her life and with those she left behind.  
Embalming and postmortem photography, create an image of what we imagine the 
experience of death to be life, the “as if” of modern, mediated death—not the past reality 
to which the facial expression and body position may seem to refer, but to an imagined 
place beyond.22 Because they use the body and the likeness of the deceased as the 
medium of this representation, embalming and photography, read as elements in 
assemblages, produce the effect of a stable identity that will persevere in memory even as 
the physical remains disappear. 
Before the advent of photography, families with substantial means often 
commissioned deathbed portraits or death masks.  Paintings had to be undertaken very 
quickly, but, like most portraits, were not necessarily prized for their realism.23  
Mourning portraits might depict living members of a family alongside the deceased, 
whose death was indicated only symbolically (a weeping willow in the background, a 
                                                        
19
 Patrice Petro, ed., Fugitive Images: From Photography to Video (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1995). 
20
 James J. Farrell, Inventing the American Way of Death, 1830-1920 (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1980), 159. 
21
 Quigley, The Corpse, 62. 
22
 Barbie Zelizer characterizes the “about to die” photograph as having a kind of subjunctive, “as 
if” function, allowing viewers to unconsciously imagine the outcome that is not depicted 
(death) never happened.  Modern embalming arguably performs the same function in a different 
mood—a future perfect which erases the trace of death and makes an image of the decease “as 
if” she were sleeping.  See Barbie Zelizer, About to Die: How News Images Move the Public, 
First Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), 12–15. 
23
 Gina Giotta, “Disappeared: Erasure in the Age of Mechanical Writing” (Dissertation, 
University of Iowa, 2010). Giotta’s chapter “Victorian Photoshop” collects a number of useful 
observations about early photography and the tension between iconic resemblance and the 
libidinal investments of bourgeois portraiture. 
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pocket watch, etc.).  Death masks satisfied the indexical urge to capture exactly the 
features of the deceased, though they were always taken after minimal composition of the 
features (eyes and mouth closed).24 These practices, however, were limited to those with 
extensive means (or great renown) and were thus not widespread.  Photography took over 
and democratized these practices, as well as providing a new, more faithfully iconic way 
of capturing the corpse in the short time before decay eats away at its resemblance to the 
deceased (or to anything human or living). 
From about 1840 to 1890, before the widespread adoption of embalming, 
photographers could count on a steady income in funeral portraits.  Moreover, 
professional photographers explicitly advertised that their services included portraits of 
deceased persons.25  A family with neither the means nor the inclination for living 
likenesses might hire a photographer in the case of a death. Often these images were the 
only likenesses ever taken of the person (especially, but not only, if the deceased were a 
child).  Moreover, corpses made much more compliant subjects than the living, whose 
stern, cramped expressions were often the result of having to hold uncomfortably still to 
accommodate long exposure times.  Corpses were photographed at home immediately 
postmortem, before they were buried, as the unique way of preserving the appearance of 
the deceased.  For this reason the focus is on the deceased’s face and head, the close-up 
providing not just a memento, but also a faithful likeness.26 
In privileging iconic reference to the deceased, the practices of postmortem 
photography also developed a visual rhetoric about death in the medium of the flesh. 
Platitudes about the “pencil of nature” notwithstanding, corpse photographers did more 
than simply record likeness: they also created a portrait of death as peaceful sleep.27 They 
might use mirrors or other reflective surfaces to accommodate lighting difficulties, and 
performed simple postmortem adjustments, such as rotating eyeballs in their sockets 
using the “handle of a teaspoon”.28  Funeral photographer Josiah Southworth describes 
some of the tricks of his trade, assuring his fellow photographers that in the moments 
immediately following death bodies are meek and pliable:  “Just lay them down as if they 
were in a sleep…Then place your camera and take your pictures just as they would look 
                                                        
24For more on death masks, see Margaret M. Green, tran., Undying Faces: A Collection of Death 
Masks (Breinigsville: Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2003), originally published by Leonard and 
Virginia Woolf in 1929. A theoretical link to the indexicality of the photograph is detailed in 
Margaret M. Green, tran., Undying Faces: A Collection of Death Masks (Breinigsville: 
Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2003); Louis Kaplan, “Photograph/Death Mask: Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
Recasting of the Photographic Image,” April 2010. 
25
 Jay Ruby, Secure the Shadow: Death and Photography in America (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 1999), 52–54. 
26
 Ruby, Secure the Shadow. 
27
 For example, an 1846 advertisement for Boston firm Southworth and Hawes states “We take 
great mains to have Miniatures of Deceased Persons agreeable and satisfactory, and they are 
often so natural as to seem, even to Artists, in a deep sleep”.  Cited in Floyd Rinhart and 
Marion Rinhart, The American Daguerreotype, 1St Edition (Athens, GA: University of Georgia 
Press, 1981), 299. 
28
 Charles E. Orr, “Post-mortem Photography,” Philadelphia Photographer 10 (1877): 200–201. 
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in life”.29 In this way, postmortem photographers used the corpse as the medium to 
represent ideas about death in general even as they worked to capture the likeness (and 
thus secure the social memory) of an individual person. 
Photography is thus a key player in the construction of the modern corpse.  
Postmortem photographs become different kinds of documents once other techniques of 
preservation are available to ‘secure the shadow’ in a different manner. After the advent 
of embalming, postmortem photographs were more likely to use special techniques to 
create a likeness that appeared to be not just asleep but actually alive. The negative might 
be rotated to give the appearance that a supine corpse was actually seated upright; or the 
negative might be painted to make it look as if the eyes were open. Here the appearance 
of life, and not just death as peaceful sleep, becomes for a time the special provenance of 
the photograph. As the funeral industry expanded, postmortem photographs increasingly 
recorded not only the deceased, but the mise-en-scène of the funeral parlor, with its 
ornate caskets, wreaths, and often with the mourners posed around the casket. In these 
images the corpse itself is very small and its likeness is not what is being recorded, but 
rather the event of the funeral itself.30  
Embalming takes over for photography the task of preserving the identity of the 
deceased in the medium of the flesh, at least for the period of time before the body is 
buried. Much like photography, then, embalming may be read as a media practice, that is, 
as an intervention that allows manipulations in space and time. Embalming conforms to a 
particular image of death first standardized in postmortem photography.31 Posed 
photographs of corpses produced an appearance of life that standardized how corpses 
would be called upon to refer to and memorialize the departed.  These photographic 
conventions would later help determine the embalmed corpse’s social role, especially as 
these images began to circulate as commodities (cartes de visite, commissioned portraits, 
etc).  
Modern embalming first emerged in the mid nineteenth century. In their History 
of American Funeral Directing, Robert Habenstein and William Lamers locate the Civil 
War as the first widespread instance of mechanical embalming in the United States, with 
“embalmers waiting and working in camps, on battlefields, in government hospitals, and 
in nearby railroad centers”.32  Modern embalming, sometimes called chemical or 
mechanical embalming, lengthened the time a corpse could remain open to the air 
without decomposition.  In so doing, it also permitted the corpse to travel home for burial 
and arrive still recognizable as the deceased. 
Previous to the use of modern embalming technologies, if corpses were preserved 
at all, it was for very brief periods either using some kind of ice-based refrigeration or (in 
the absence of ice) submersion in a cold creek.  Burial happened almost immediately, and 
near the place of death—whether or not this was home (war dead were often buried or 
                                                        
29
 Josiah Southworth, “A Panel Discussion on Technique,” Philadelphia Photographer 10 (1873): 
279–280. 
30
 Ruby, Secure the Shadow, 16. 
31
 Troyer, “Embalmed Vision.,” 30. 
32
 Robert Wesley Habenstein, The History of American Funeral Directing, 5th ed. (Milwaukee: 
National Funeral Directors Association, 2001), 212. 
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burned on or near battlefields, for example).  In the rare occasion of an attempt to 
transport a corpse by rail, airtight metal caskets were used. These containers were meant 
only to transport remains, not preserve them; they sometimes failed even in this task, as 
they exploded under the pressure of the gasses released by the decomposing corpse.33  
Unlike other forms of preservation, embalming allowed the body to retain the 
appearance of the deceased for longer, more stable periods of time.  Ice preservation, for 
example, does not slow decomposition enough to allow for more than limited transport or 
display—and, before refrigeration, it was at best messy and expensive and more likely 
impossible.  Freezing the body, rather than simply refrigerating it, allows for preservation 
of the flesh but irrevocably destroys delicate tissues. Corpses that were frozen during the 
winter and awaited a spring burial, once thawed bore no resemblance to the deceased, and 
indeed presented a grotesque and troubling appearance. Embalming is chemical, not 
physical, and although it radically alters the chemical composition of tissues,34 it actually 
preserves appearances as faithfully as any photograph. 
The mechanics of chemical or mechanical embalming are relatively simple.  The 
basic innovation is a hand-held vacuum pump (now electric) that injects the dead body 
with a preservative chemical solution using the circulatory system.  The organic bodily 
fluids are first drained also using this vacuum pump, thus minimizing the embalmer’s 
invasion into the body (Troyer 30).35 Modern embalming uses already existing corporeal 
routes and processes (the circulatory system, osmosis) to radically alter the chemical 
composition of tissues via the introduction of embalming fluid.   
Embalming fluid is a suspension of alcohols, resins, and waxes, along with 
detergents and disinfectants that pervade the tissues via osmosis. In time, further 
innovations in the injection of fluids into sensitive skin around the mouth and eyes would 
be used to create embalmings such as Lenin and Evita that are intended for permanent 
display.  The funeral director’s art may now involve a detailed range of manipulations, 
tools, and cosmetics, even including surgeries in some cases.36 In an illustrative mingling 
of the entertainment and funerary industries, so-called “mortician’s wax,” which is used 
to rebuild crushed or torn facial tissues, was in the pre CGI period also a key tool for the 
creation of special effects in film and television.    
Given the dramatic changes it introduced in funerary practices, it is remarkable 
how quickly embalming was naturalized as part of the cultural process of death. Now, 
instead of merely washing the body while it rested on a board suspended over buckets of 
                                                        
33
 Sterne, The Audible Past, 295; Habenstein, The History of American Funeral Directing, 334–5. 
34
 The change can be compared to what happens to an egg white when it is boiled. See Christine 
Quigley, Modern Mummies: The Preservation of the Human Body in the Twentieth Century 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2006), 5; Robert Mayer, Embalming: History, Theory, 
and Practice, Fifth Edition, 5th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Medical, 2011), 113. 
35
 Troyer, “Embalmed Vision.,” 30. In contrast, Egyptian embalmings included removal of 
viscera and even the brains by hand and then preserving them in separate jars.  Here the 
purpose was preservation as such, not preservation of the appearance of life. 
36
 Kennedy, for example, was prepared for public viewing even though in the end the casket 
remained closed.  Because of the massive damage to his head and face, a team of postmortem 
cosmetic surgeons faced the enormous task of making his corpse not only presentable, but 
recognizable. 
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ice, families could bring the body to the funeral parlor where a technician would embalm 
and prepare it for burial under laboratory-like conditions. When chemical embalming was 
still a relatively new technology, some feared that because of this intrusion, the 
embalmed dead would not be allowed into heaven.37 Nevertheless, within a generation, 
embalming was standard practice.  The first embalming manual was translated from the 
French into English in 1840; between 1856 and 1869 eleven major patents were granted 
for fluids and processes, thus indicating a less than thirty year span in which Gannal’s 
“new process” was being put to use and commodified.38  
Hence embalming’s early appeal was not so much its power of preservation as 
such, but its power to preserve the appearance of life.  An embalming ad from 1863 
describes its service as “to admit of contemplation of the person Embalmed, with the 
countenance of one asleep”.39 “Countenance,” a rather antiquated term, refers particularly 
to the face as an indication of mood or expression.  It highlights the face’s expressive, 
communicative function.  In other words, the face is to be “read” as indicating peaceful 
slumber, thus reinforcing Victorian attitudes towards death as the “long sleep” that were 
also the rhetoric of postmortem photography. This signifying countenance, in both media, 
constitutes legibility as not only a deceased person, but as a commentary on the way of 
all flesh. 
Embalming introduces changes similar to the changes introduced by mass 
communication media with regard to the manipulation of space and time.  For example, 
the embalmed corpse “circulated outside of conventional time and space,” whereas before 
embalming, a kind of “corpse time” had determined practices surrounding mourning and 
burial.40  A manipulation in time—the embalming— therefore allows a manipulation of 
space as well. 
Thus embalming not only emerged alongside major media such as sound 
recording, photography, the railroad (known to the nineteenth century as “steam 
communication”) and the telegraph; it also shares in their narrative of technological 
domination over space and time.  Human intervention in “corpse time” also allowed for 
physical transport of bodies.  A preserved body, because it endures in time, is also much 
more easily transported in space, thus giving embalming technology a two-pronged 
domination and control over the ‘natural’ corpse.41 Insofar as chemical embalming 
privileges vision and allows for more control over the body in space and time, it partakes 
in many of the social changes wrought by an emerging mass media.  
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 Habenstein, The History of American Funeral Directing, 448. 
38
 Jean-Nicolas Gannal, History of Embalming, and of Preparations in Anatomy, Pathology, and 
Natural History; Including An, trans. Richard Harlan (Charleston, NC: BiblioBazaar, 2009); 
Habenstein, The History of American Funeral Directing, 328. 
39
 Habenstein, The History of American Funeral Directing, 217. Emphasis mine. 
40
 Troyer, “Embalmed Vision.,” 39. 
41
 This argument matches Carey’s observations about the telegraph.  See James W. Carey, 
“Space, Time, and Communications: A Tribute to Harold Innis,” in Communication as Culture, 
Revised Edition: Essays on Media and Society, New edition (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1992), 142–172. 
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The embalmed corpse also exhibits the blurring between subject and object that 
characterizes the age of modern media.42 As “postmortem subject” and commodified 
object, the corpse disrupts stable dualities between subjectivity and objecthood.  It may 
be read as a special object whose last remnants of subjectivity—the embalming that 
allows it to meaningfully reference the deceased—confer upon it a kind of marginal 
subjectivity.  Nevertheless it is in its status as object that it circulates as commodity, 
either within the economic system of the funeral industry or, as Lock shows, as the “field” 
from which organs are “harvested” and sold/gifted/donated.43 It is as thing—as flesh—
that the embalmed corpse becomes a medium; it is on the flesh that embalming works 
and in the flesh that it presents itself as postmortem subject.     
This great modernist push to manipulate or dominate space and time and to 
carefully delineate subject and object becomes poignant when we turn away from its very 
real associations with empire and sovereignty and turn to its historical attempts to 
eradicate death.  However much embalming technology may master the corpse as object, 
it can never reanimate it.  We look back on spirit photography and other early uses of 
archival media to “secure the shadow” as quaint, antiquated delusions.  Embalming is one 
such delusion that persists to the present, obscured though it is by death’s general 
effacement from the practices of everyday life.The embalmed corpse therefore may be 
considered a particularly compelling archive of inscription practices at their most 
emotional root.  
 
Conclusion 
Corpses embody mediation without being wholly human, thus pointing us towards a 
materialist analysis of media. Photography and embalming are mediations that work upon 
the corpse to produce an assemblage of meaningful grief, memory, and inheritance. 
When we apprehend the corpse as a culturally legible yet wholly material object, then, we 
deploy a rich variety of interpretive strategies to make sense of the material. Using 
assemblage theory allows us to account for non hegemonic interpretations of the social 
value of any given deceased identity. Whenever a public figure dies, subsequent 
generations invoke and deploy her memory to legitimize actions and interpretations 
whose finality is never guaranteed. This memory has a material substrate, and it is this 
material substrate that makes real the possibility of polysemy and heterogeneity in 
memory and in the political action undertaken in its name.  
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 Marshall McLuhan and Lewis H. Lapham, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, First 
Edition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 61–65. 
43Lock excellently unpacks the economy of the gift, thus rendering the rhetoric of ‘organ 
donation’ suspect under late capitalism.  SeeMargaret Lock, Twice Dead: Organ Transplants 
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